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THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND by James Boyle.  Yale University Press, 2008, 315 pp. Paperback 
$28.50. 
 
Reviewed by Julie Cromer Young, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.   
jyoung@tjsl.edu. 
 
In the age of the Internet, what are lawmakers doing to protect the public 
from copyright?  This is the central question James Boyle considers as he 
explores the history, application, and future of intellectual property laws to 
works of authorship using contemporary technologies. On one hand, Boyle 
draws lessons from history, adroitly explaining the positions of legal 
theorists such as Thomas Babington Macaulay and Thomas Jefferson 
toward the possibilities and limitations of intellectual property.  On the 
other hand, Boyle draws distinctions from pre-Internet thought, noting the 
transformations on traditional intellectual property that the age of 
instantaneous publication and distribution requires.  The theme unifying the 
two is clear:  In our history of expanding intellectual property rights, 
legislatures have consistently neglected to preserve the public domain as an 
important natural resource. 
 
After briefly explaining the relevant intellectual property law for those not 
already versed in the field, Boyle focuses the reader on a letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, dated 1813 (p.17).  In that letter, 
Jefferson opines about the theoretical underpinnings of intellectual property, 
“[c]onsidering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, 
but for the benefit of society”1 (p.21).  Boyle identifies a set of cautions in 
Jefferson’s letter, labeling the “Jefferson Warning,” akin to Miranda 
Warnings given suspected criminals (p.21).   Those cautions include the 
difference between intellectual property and tangible property, the lack of 
entitlement to intellectual property rights, and inherent and proscribed 
limitations on intellectual property rights (p.21-22).  Writings and orations 
of others, such as British Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, mirrored this 
philosophy about intellectual property, questioning the assertion that 
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copyright is a natural right and upholding “a tradition of skeptical 
minimalism” that treated intellectual property rights warily (p.35). 
 
If the Jefferson Warning is Boyle’s protagonist, its antagonist is the Internet 
Threat—the notion that “[w]ithout an increase in private property rights, ... 
cheaper copying will eat the heart out of our creative and cultural 
industries” (p.53).  This Internet Threat, Boyle argues, is responsible for a 
pervasive belief that “[t]he strength of intellectual property rights must vary 
inversely with the cost of copying” (p.60).  In turn, this belief has led to a 
system that ignores the benefits of the Internet and instead seeks merely to 
contain it, and in particular, the intellectual property its users may copy.  
The intended result is achieved by a conversion of previously common 
property into private ownership—a second “enclosure movement” 
reminiscent of the enclosure of English commons from the fifteenth to the 
nineteenth centuries (p.43). 
 
Conversion is occurring in the form of piecemeal legislation intended to 
address specific needs of specific industries, effectively curtailing public 
access to information that would previously have been considered incapable 
of ownership.  As an example, Boyle considers the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).2  The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of 
copyright protection systems, such as encryption and digital rights 
management.  Application of the DMCA, by granting rights irrespective of 
traditional copyright analysis including fair use, operates contrary to the 
First Amendment, becoming “a congressionally created off-switch for fair 
use” created specifically as a reaction to the Internet Threat (p.97).  
Moreover, interpretation of the DMCA through the courts has stifled the 
competition that intellectual property rights are intended to foster. 
 
Specific examples further illustrate the importance and recent enclosure of 
the public domain to creative and innovative industries, as well as those 
industries’ disparate reactions.   In an interesting narrative, Boyle integrates 
pop culture and copyright law to demonstrate how the music industry, once 
reliant on the public domain for inspiration, now thwarts others in that same 
creative process with increased rules and heightened protection.  Asks 
Boyle, “[a]re we in fact killing musical creativity with the rules that are 
supposed to defend it?” (p.156).   
 
On the other hand, Boyle examines the cases of synthetic biology and 
computer code, reflecting that the successful steps taken to grant intellectual 
property rights in industry outputs have resulted in a countermovement to 
ensure the public availability of information. In the field of synthetic 
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biology, in which “the product or process involves biological materials not 
found in nature” (p.171), many scientists rebuff patent rights in the name of 
innovation.  Notes Boyle, “I was depressed by the idea that scientists would 
have to spend their valuable time trying to work out how to save their 
discipline from being messed up by the law” (p.174).  In the case of 
computer software, the creators took charge, offering the software as free 
and open source.  Using the General Public License from the Creative 
Commons, Boyle notes that the: 
 
…open quality of the creative enterprise spreads.  It is not simply a 
donation of a program or a work to the public domain, but a 
continual accretion in which all gain the benefits of the program on 
pain of agreeing to give their additions and innovations back to the 
communal project (p.186). 
 
One of Boyle’s stronger arguments is to recognize that these examples and 
arguments are just that, and the ultimate proof may be a “test case in which 
one country adopts the proposed new intellectual property right and another 
similarly situated country does not, and we can assess how they are both 
doing after a number of years” (p.207).  To this end, he studies the 
European Union Database Directive,3 the sui generis right in effect in the 
European Union since 1996, and the resulting report by the Commission 
tasked with evaluating it ten years later.  His conclusions, and the 
conclusions of the European Union Commission, are telling: even when 
given specific intellectual property rights to stimulate intellectual creation in 
a given industry, that protection actually hinders production of new 
databases, as opposed to facilitating it.  The analogy is imperfect.  It might 
be difficult to posit that the United States is a country “similarly situated” to 
any European country in the production of databases, and this example 
addresses creation of a new ilk of intellectual property as opposed to the 
extension of established intellectual property rights to new technologies. 
Despite these weaknesses, Boyle’s story of the Database Directive responds 
nicely to the question of whether governmental privatization of information 
has any social benefit at all. 
 
Ultimately, Boyle calls us out on our cultural agoraphobia—our likelihood 
“to undervalue the importance, viability, and productive power of open 
systems, open networks, and nonproprietary production” (p.231).  He 
identifies the major problems intellectual property faces—the relative 
obscurity of the issue, the implications for distinct and separate groups, the 
ideology shaping its adherents’ beliefs, and the lack of empirical 
evidence— and posits that this moment in time for intellectual property law 
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and policy is at the same point that the environmental law movement 
occupied in the 1950s (p.239).  He calls for a “cultural environmental 
movement” (p.247), allowing us to see and preserve the public domain as a 
national resource just as important as clean air and water.  And, while 
tempering his criticism with optimism, Boyle leaves us with a warning of 
his own: 
 
Good intellectual property policy will not save our culture.  But bad 
policy may lock up our cultural heritage unnecessarily, leave it to 
molder in libraries, forbid citizens to digitize it, even though the vast 
majority of it will never be available publicly and no copyright 
owner can be found (p.246). 
 
1 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813), in 
13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 335 (Albert Ellery 
Bergh ed., The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Society of the United States, 
1907), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_papers/mtjserI.html.  
 
2 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in sections of 5, 17, 28, and 35 
U.S.C.). 
 
3 Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 77, 
27.3.1996, p. 20–28, located at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEX 
numdoc&numdoc=31996L0009&model=guichett&lg=en.    
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GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS: 
PATENT POOLS, CLEARINGHOUSES, OPEN SOURCE MODELS 
AND LIABILITY REGIMES, edited by Geertrui Van Overwalle.  
Cambridge University Press, 2009, 455 pp. Hardcover $123.00. 
 
Reviewed by J. Jonas Anderson, Microsoft Research Fellow,  
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology.  
janderson@law.berkeley.edu. 
 
The typically esoteric world of patents has recently been thrust into the 
headlines as cases involving patented genes have received an unprecedented 
amount of press.  For decades, academics, scientists, practicing attorneys, 
and legislators have vigorously debated the merits of granting patents on 
genes and medical diagnostic procedures.  Only recently, however, have the 
courts entered the fray.  For example, in March 2010, Judge Sweet of the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York handed down a 
ruling that invalidated a number of patents covering the BRCA genes that 
signal an increased likelihood of developing breast cancer.1  Judge Sweet’s 
ruling held that the patent claims on the BRCA genes were directed to 
unpatentable “product of nature.” A few months later in a separate case, the 
U.S Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, following a grant-vacate-
remand from the Supreme Court, upheld the validity of a patented method 
for determining a proper drug dosage level based on a patient’s metabolite 
levels.2 The courts’ entrance into the debate surrounding patenting of 
human genetic material and medical diagnostics has elicited interest from 
the full spectrum of public news outlets: from the New York Times to 
Nature magazine.3 It would seem that one, or perhaps both, of these cases 
will be heard at the Supreme Court.  In any case, the contentiousness 
surrounding gene patenting and diagnostic patenting is unlikely to subside 
any time soon. 
 
In light of the controversy surrounding patents on genetic material, Geertrui 
Van Overwalle has compiled a collection of writings on this topic by an 
outstanding group of academics and practicing attorneys in a book titled 
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GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS.  
Van Overwalle and her fellow contributors ask whether collaborative 
licensing models can reduce public concerns that gene patents will lead to 
reduced access to research and health care choices.  Van Overwalle’s book 
examines the best methods of achieving innovation and maximizing access 
while assuming that “the problems created by patent law in genetic 
diagnostics are best served by contractual, collaborative measures” (p.454), 
and not by restricting patentability as some commentators have proposed.  
In light of the book’s purpose and scope, this review will touch on the 
licensing ideas raised by the authors while critically examining Van 
Overwalle’s summary of the various authors’ contributions, which appears 
at the book’s conclusion.   
 
Before providing private solutions to the problems surrounding gene 
patenting, Van Overwalle first seeks to identify the precise problems that 
widespread patenting of genetic material and diagnostic procedures create.  
Two primary concerns are identified, both of which focus on transaction 
costs.  First, the book examines the problem of increased transaction costs 
in upstream or basic research.  Incentives to engage in initial upstream 
research can be reduced when an excessive number of property rights 
holders drive up the transaction costs associated with commercializing those 
property rights.4 In the patent field, upstream research is thought to be 
harmed when, in order to commercialize a particular technology, it is 
necessary to obtain rights in a multitude of patents held by a multitude of 
owners (patent thickets), or when multiple patents covering the same 
technology are held by competing patent owners (blocking patents).  
Various contributors to GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE 
LICENSING MODELS note that empirical studies suggest that patent 
thickets are not currently a concern in the genetics field (pp.4, 387).  
Regardless, many observers predict that patent thickets may emerge in the 
field of medical diagnostics as diagnostic tools improve and personalized 
DNA arrays become more affordable.  Indeed, patent clearance may prove 
to be the primary driver of diagnostic cost in the coming age of personalized 
medicine.  Second, the book examines the risk of reduced downstream 
investment, or under-commercialization of patented genetic inventions.  At 
least part of the “translational gap” between early-stage genetic research and 
therapeutic applications of that research may stem from the transaction 
costs associated with drug-related negotiations between academic and 
industry players. 
 
In order to overcome obstacles to the upstream research problem, Van 
Overwalle’s book examines three primary collaborative arrangements: 
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patent pools, clearinghouses, and open source models.  Patent pools, such as 
the DVD and MPEG-2 pools, have been successfully employed for some 
time by the electronics industry (pp.33-41). However, the translation of a 
licensing arrangement from the electronics industry to the diagnostic 
industry is not without pitfalls.  First, most successful patent pools to date 
(particularly in the electronics industry) have been established in order to 
create industry standards; the genetics industry, by contrast, does not have 
such standards with which to comply (pp.38, 48).  Whereas the electronics 
industry is able to increase the value of its products via mutually agreed-
upon standards, the genetics industry does not enjoy such interoperability 
benefits.  The lack of standards-driven economics in the genetic industry 
leads Birgit Verbeure to conclude that patent pools will not provide great 
benefits to the genetics industry (p.29).  Second, and perhaps most troubling 
from a diagnostic perspective is the problem of holdouts.  In the electronics 
industry, interdependency increases value; the establishment of standards 
(e.g., the standard diameter of compact discs) increases interoperability and 
reduces or eliminates switch-over costs.  In essence, consumer electronics 
manufacturers rely on their competitors to create a market for electronic 
products.  Value in the biotech industry, on the other hand, is driven by 
exclusivity, not interoperability (pp.55-56).  Thus, biotech patentees risk 
much less and stand to gain much more than electronics patentees by 
refraining from joining a patent pool.  Some authors, such as Jorge 
Goldstein, envision a standards-based regime emerging in the biotech 
industry via respected health organizations such as the WHO or NIH (p.56).  
Others, including Dan Burk and Verbeure, suggest that reducing the 
property-like rights of the patent holder (either through liability regimes or 
compulsory licenses) may ameliorate some of the holdout issues (pp.28, 
306).  While promising, both governmentally-set standards and compulsory 
licenses involve non-contractual solutions to the holdout problem, which, as 
I discuss below, is not optimal. 
 
The second licensing arrangement discussed in Van Overwalle’s book is the 
clearinghouse model.  Clearinghouses come in many shapes and sizes, some 
dealing primarily with efficient knowledge transfer while others are 
concerned with rights management and royalty collection.  While the idea 
of facilitating access and knowledge through clearinghouses enjoys 
universal authorial support, the various authors acknowledge that the 
analogy between existing copyright clearinghouses and potential patent 
clearinghouses is inexact at best and undesirable at worst.  For example, 
Esther Van Zimmeren concludes that the time is not ripe for patent royalty 
collection clearinghouses (pp.111-12).  She reads the literature on copyright 
clearinghouses as demonstrating that while “collectivization” of rights and 
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enforcement may indeed increase the value of IP rights, it is unclear 
whether access is increased by such clearinghouses (pp.111-12). Michael 
Spence cautions that any analogy between established copyright 
clearinghouses and potential patent clearinghouses is inexact (pp.166-67).  
Spence concludes that patent royalty clearinghouses could lower transaction 
costs for genetic innovators, but may also increase royalty stacking and cost 
of access for consumers (p.167).  For Spence, establishment of patent 
clearinghouses will not overcome the potential anticommons problems in 
the genetics industry and may exacerbate rather than remedy the access 
problem in diagnostics (pp.166-68). 
 
The book suggests that open source models are a third licensing scheme that 
could be employed to improve access to diagnostics while maintaining 
incentives to innovate in the industry.  Janet Hope proposes employing the 
open-source model that has transformed the software industry (p.192).  
However, other authors cast doubt on the applicability of software norms 
into the genetics industry conclusion.  Arti Rai notes that the set of 
participants and economic realities in biotechnology is wholly different than 
that of software (p.217).  Whereas the software industry involves numerous 
manufacturers and millions of users, the biotech industry has a smaller set 
of players and a targeted group of potential consumers.  More importantly, 
there is little evidence that IP rights are strong drivers of creation in the 
software industry, whereas IP serves as the principal incentive to biotech 
companies (p.215).  Thus, software designers are likely to be much more 
willing than their biotech counterparts to contribute to a public commons.  
Echoing Rai’s suggestion that the high value of IP in the biotech industry 
may severely reduce the applicability of an open source model, Andrzej 
Kilian states that the only opportunity for using open-source in genetics will 
be “in an area of limited financial opportunity, where competition with 
mainstream companies would be less intense” (p.211).  Wholly new 
business models would have to arise in order for biotech to embrace open-
source, Van Overwalle concludes (p.431). 
 
Van Overwalle concludes that licensing schemes meant to solve the patent 
thicket problem in upstream research (namely patent pools, clearinghouses, 
and open source models) are capable of achieving the goal of increasing 
access to diagnostic procedures (p.454).  She is optimistic that pools, 
clearinghouses and open source can enable access despite widespread 
genetic patenting.  Her conclusion, however, does not enjoy universal 
agreement from her contributors.  The controversy surrounding the 
applicability of such regimes stems from their ability to attract actors 
interested in maximizing the value of their intellectual property.  While 
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open-source models have been employed to increase access to intellectual 
property-protected goods in the software industry, the translation of open-
source models to diagnostic testing appears to be limited to the small subset 
of cases in which profit motive is not the driving force behind research and 
development.  Van Overwalle notes that numerous commentators are 
skeptical of open-source’s feasibility in a for-profit genetics setting: “[I]t is 
questionable whether [the open source] model can stand the test in market 
segments aiming at the largest potential profit margins, such as the 
biomedicine sector” (pp.452).  Obviously, this is a rather large problem.  If 
open source is not an attractive alternative for profit-maximizing 
organizations, the ability of open source to overcome access problems in the 
medical diagnostics industry will be quite limited.  Van Overwalle’s 
optimism regarding the ability of licensing schemes to overcome research 
access problems also must be tempered by the reality that few authors can 
offer a licensing solution to the holdout problem.  If valuable genetic 
patents are withheld from pooling or clearinghouse schemes, the 
effectiveness of those schemes in reducing transaction costs is likely to be 
greatly limited.  Van Overwalle acknowledges this problem (pp.448) and 
suggests that “compulsory license schemes and informal norms of fair 
licensing” can be helpful in eliminating blocking patents.  Of course, if 
reducing the access problems associated with genetic patents requires some 
form of compulsory licensing scheme or relies on the establishment of 
informal norms, then licensing models such as clearinghouses and patent 
pools are either unnecessary or inadequate to solve the problems associated 
with upstream research of diagnostic innovations.   
 
To address the translational gap, the book deftly moves from the problem of 
patent thickets and blocking patents, to the problem of downstream 
commercialization.  Oftentimes patents can stymie the translation of early-
stage genetic inventions into medical applications because patents increase 
the transaction costs between upstream researchers (often-times academics 
or publically funded institutions) and downstream developers (typically 
private entities) (pp.392-93).  This so-called “translational gap” is well-
known in the pharmaceutical industry, but seems to be less prominent in the 
field of diagnostics (pp.246-57, 392-93), primarily because finding a link 
between a particular nucleic acid sequence and the ability to diagnose a 
disease does not involve the same enormous investment that creating 
marketable drugs entails. 
 
In order to bridge the translational gap, the book examines various liability 
regimes.  The most robust proposed solution to the translation gap comes 
from Arti Rai.  Rai proposes a two-tiered public-private partnership in 
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which participants enter into contractual agreements to treat their 
discoveries under a liability regime rather than as property (p.247).  Initial 
research would be conducted behind a “veil of ignorance” which would be 
breached only when promising collaborators had been identified.  The 
attractiveness of Rai’s proposal is that it increases knowledge sharing 
(assuming buy-in by a large number of players) and reduces transaction 
costs.  Dan Burk builds on Rai’s proposal, likening the regime to one of 
option trading (pp.294-306). Van Overwalle concludes that liability regimes 
are “rather limited in this area [diagnostics]” (p.454). She bases this 
conclusion on the practical difficulties that implementing any liability 
regime is bound to face.  Her concern with the hurdles faced by a liability 
regime is, of course, correct.  The implementation of a large-scale liability 
regime to encourage development of medical technology is destined to 
encounter practical problems: the devil is always in the details.  However, 
as Rai’s elaborate proposal demonstrates, there is common ground upon 
which profit-maximizing corporations and academic researchers can 
collaborate and which can result in increased diagnostic tools at reduced 
prices to consumers.  Because Rai’s liability regime is modeled on a world 
in which players are profit-maximizing, it would seem that such a regime 
would offer the best potential to create real-world change.  Van Overwalle’s 
practical objections aside, liability regimes provide a theoretical licensing 
solution to reduced commercialization of genetic discoveries. 
 
At the end of the book, Van Overwalle writes a final piece to summarize 
and crystallize the various contributions of the authors.  Her synthesis of the 
literature and the contributions is very nicely done and gives the book—
which is truly an exploration of the future landscape—a feeling of finality.  
The book offers an important survey of different perspectives on what is 
certain to be a central issue in patent law going forward.  Van Overwalle 
has done an excellent job in creating a compilation that offers diverse 
perspectives on the feasibility and desirability of translating successful 
licensing schemes from other industries (electronics, software, 
entertainment) to biotechnology.  Anyone interested in the future of 
diagnostic and genetic patents—and the manner in which the social 
drawbacks of such patents might be mitigated—would be well-advised to 
examine the book. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S.P.T.O, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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2 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 2010 WL 
5175124 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010). 
 
3 New York Times, March 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/30gene.html; Jeffrey L. 
Furman, et. al, 468 Nature 757-78 (Dec. 9, 2010).  
 
4 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property 
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harvard L. R. 668 (1998). 
 
© 2011 J. Jonas Anderson 
 
Suggested Citation:  1 The IP Law Book Review 54 (2011). 
 
The IP Law Book Review 60
 Vol. 1 No. 2 (February 2011) pp. 61-68 
 
VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF ONLINE WORLDS, by 
Greg Lastowka. Yale University Press, 2010, 226 pp. Hardcover $27.50. 
 
Reviewed by William K. Ford, The John Marshall Law School. 
7ford@jmls.edu 
 
Greg Lastowka’s VIRTUAL JUSTICE is an introduction to the legal issues 
involving virtual worlds, examples of which include Blizzard 
Entertainment’s World of Warcraft, Linden Lab’s Second Life, and 
Disney’s Club Penguin. Many of these virtual worlds are gaming worlds, 
though some, like Second Life, are better described as social worlds. 
Lastowka discusses several areas of law, focusing on issues of jurisdiction, 
contract, property, computer fraud (hacking), and copyright (with other 
areas of intellectual property law receiving only passing attention (p.194)). 
While in many ways the book is a survey of the field, threaded throughout 
the discussion are two related arguments, both made quite gently. The first 
is that it is meaningful to conceive of “virtual law” as a separate body of 
law. At present, virtual law is only “one corner of cyberlaw” (p.74), but 
Lastowka predicts it will and should become a distinct and recognized body 
of new law in the future (pp.11, 69). The second is that virtual law should 
be distinctive in large part by empowering customers against the “wizards” 
and the “online overlords” who own and control virtual worlds (pp.153, 
195).  
 
Lastowka defines virtual worlds as “persistent, interactive, simulated social 
places where users employ avatars” (p.31). For those who are not up to 
speed on virtual worlds, let alone the legal issues raised by them, the early 
chapters will fill in the gaps. While the lines between them are not rigid, 
Lastowka divides virtual worlds into three basic categories: (1) MMORPGs 
(Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games), (2) social worlds, and 
(3) kid worlds (p.58). MMORPGs like World of Warcraft are the game 
worlds (pp.59-61). Social worlds like Second Life are virtual worlds 
without the gaming elements. They are instead places to “hang out” (pp.61-
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64). Kid worlds may be more like MMORPGs or more like social worlds, 
but either way, they are oriented towards children and feature heavy 
restrictions on what users can do and say (pp.64-66). In explaining the 
development of these modern virtual worlds, Lastowka reviews several 
areas of relevant history, including the ancient Greeks (Plato’s Cave) and 
more contemporary novels, films, television shows, and non-electronic 
games (pp.29-38). For example, Dungeons & Dragons, probably more than 
any other game, provided important ideas for the features and content of 
early computer adventure games, and its influence remains evident to this 
day (pp.36-38, 59). The history of virtual worlds is of course in substantial 
part the history of computer and video games, and Lastowka covers the 
important developments here as well.1  
 
Lastowka’s first major point is the distinctive character of virtual law. Like 
aviation law, which became the subject of comprehensive legislation in the 
1920s, he sees virtual law as also becoming a body of “new law” (pp.68-
69). As someone who teaches a seminar on computer and video game law, 
it might be expected that I would be sympathetic to this argument, but I see 
this area of law as mostly about the nuances of established fields of law, 
such as intellectual property law and First Amendment law. A sensible law 
school course is not about examples of disputes that happen to involve 
video games (or horses), e.g., an employment discrimination dispute that 
involves a video game publisher, but it could be about legal questions where 
the presence of video games affects the legal analysis. For example, what 
features of a game constitute unprotectable procedures, processes, or 
systems under 17 U.S.C. 102(b)?2 Are video games more like posters and 
coffee mugs or more like books and films for purposes of the right of 
publicity?3 May the government restrict minors’ access to violent video 
games because video games have negative effects attributable to video 
games’ particular form of interactivity? Even if focusing on these questions 
does not “illuminate the entire law,”4 they are substantial and worthwhile, 
but I don’t think they define a truly separate area of law. Lastowka, 
however, finds more than just nuances in virtual law.    
 
Virtual worlds often include gaming elements, and Lastowka views law and 
games as an uneasy mix, at least as the law exists now. He views games as 
separate jurisdictions from law, “jurisdictions of play” (p.105). Games are a 
“rival regime of social ordering” to law, and game rules are “inherently in 
tension with the rules of law” (p.105). “We desire laws,” says Lastowka, “to 
be rationally designed to efficiently promote the common good” (p.108). 
Games are different. They are “strange, inefficient, and economically 
counterproductive” (p.137). The consequence is apparently to push the law 
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and virtual worlds apart and create both an opportunity and a need for new 
law to deal with the resulting “anarchic online frontier” (p.121). 
 
This tension between law and games is, I think, overstated. We want law to 
further the common good and various social ends. One of these ends surely 
includes the individual enjoyment afforded by a recreational activity like 
gaming. As a related example, law presumably favors the (efficient) 
production of films desired by consumers. It would be odd if law was then 
hostile to consumers enjoying them, as if law favored only production and 
not consumption. Perhaps the enjoyment of games is somehow different 
than the enjoyment of films in terms of efficiency, but the apparent 
inefficiency of games is essential to their enjoyment. Lastowka quotes 
Bernard Suits’ characterization of games as being “directed towards 
bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by the 
rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favor of less efficient 
means” (p.109). But Lastowka omits the rest of this description: “the rules 
[of games] are accepted just because they make possible such activity.”5 
The rules are essential to a game. While Lastowka concludes “play is . . . 
oriented toward a process, not a goal” (p.115), Suits points out the 
important relationship between rule-governed processes and goals: “Rules 
in games thus seem to be in some sense inseparable from ends, for to break 
a game rule is to render impossible the attainment of an end.”6 Assume a 
race around a circular track, an example used by both Suits and Lastowka 
(p.109). Would law, with its goal of efficiency, prefer that the contestants 
cut across the middle rather than run around the track? Lastowka apparently 
thinks so, but I don’t see why. 
 
While I do not think that there is an inherent tension between law and 
games, I agree with Lastowka that they can sometimes clash. Lastowka 
discusses the example of the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding that the 
decisions of football referees cannot be challenged in court (p.109).7 He 
suggests that “law may have difficulty balancing the competing interests” 
between law and games because game rules are “sub-optimal” (p.110), but 
the law’s existing interest in efficiency and the common good seems a help 
rather than a hindrance. It supports allowing players to resolve their 
disputes through expert private referees rather than courts, at least when the 
disputes are of the conventional type for the relevant game. And despite the 
literal words of the Georgia Supreme Court—“courts of equity in this state 
are without authority to review decisions of football referees”8—there are 
undoubtedly limits. Referees cannot imprison or execute players as 
penalties, but there is much referees can do that courts can quite properly 
and quite confidently decline to second guess. 
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As a potentially more serious clash between law and games, Lastowka 
claims that courts have allowed at least some games, such as football, to 
“operate outside the boundaries of traditional social expectations” because 
at least some violence is permitted in football (p.113). Traditional social 
expectations, however, often countenance at least some violence. It all 
depends on the context. Russian roulette is out because the risks are so great 
and the benefits are so negligible.9 Football offers greater benefits (in terms 
of competitive enjoyment and spectator entertainment), and it does so with 
much less risk than Russian roulette. The limited autonomy granted to 
football is not because games are a sort of oddity that law struggles to deal 
with, but because law recognizes this autonomy is necessary to preserve the 
legitimate social value of games.  
 
To the extent law grants games limited autonomy, what do we make of 
situations where, for example, game rules allow one player to defraud 
another, especially in a virtual world containing virtual property with real 
world value? Lastowka quotes a commenter on a blog who rejects the 
notion that such activity should be a problem: “It would be like suing 
someone you lost to at poker” (p.121). This seems correct to me. Like 
bluffing in poker or outright lying in a game of Diplomacy, thievery could 
very well be a legitimate “play style.” In Electronic Arts’ Ultima Online, 
this is the clearly stated rule (p.13). Thievery is part of playing the game, 
not the basis for a complaint to Electronic Arts—or to a court.10 Lastowka 
seems to have doubts about these types of rules, even when they are clear, 
but the more difficult problem he discusses involves situations where the 
rules of the game are ambiguous. 
 
Ambiguous rules of conduct with real world monetary consequences can 
arise in any virtual world, including social worlds that lack traditional 
gaming elements and even in virtual worlds that prohibit the buying and 
selling of virtual items. Not surprisingly, there is extensive buying and 
selling of these items in violation of contract terms. Lastowka reports that 
Blizzard Entertainment has closed thousands of World of Warcraft accounts 
of players engaged in “gold farming,” the harvesting of virtual money to 
sell to other players (pp.22-24). Sony Online closed the account of someone 
who supposedly made approximately $100,000 from selling virtual 
currency for Everquest II (p.159). In these situations, the gold farmers knew 
the risks of violating the contract terms. A loss from closed accounts, when 
it happens, does not seem inappropriate. Nor is it unfair to prohibit buying 
and selling in the first place. Virtual world owners need to control their 
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worlds to maintain the experience of players (p.140). Even insuring the 
scarcity of virtual items is necessary to maintain player interest (p.165).  
 
But what if virtual property is legitimately bought and sold in a virtual 
world, and someone loses this investment for violating an ambiguous rule? 
Such problems are not completely novel. As a related example, courts have 
resolved ambiguous contest rules. In one case, the question was whether a 
player in a golf tournament managed to shoot a hole-in-one on the required 
hole to win an automobile; unfortunately, the required hole was 
ambiguously defined.11 Virtual worlds magnify this type of interpretive 
problem. Games like poker have relatively simple rules compared to a 
virtual world. The software necessary to support a virtual world and 
regulate player conduct is extremely complicated. Glitches and bugs are 
common and are often discovered by players before the virtual world 
owners (pp.156-160). It can often be genuinely unclear whether a particular 
activity in a virtual world constitutes cheating and different players can 
legitimately have different expectations (pp.121, 145-46). Hard cases will 
likely result.  
 
As an additional complication, virtual world users may expect owners to 
assist them against other users. Second Life’s terms allowing users to retain 
their copyrights in uploaded content inevitably generates conflicts among 
users over copyright violations (pp.191-93). Users with disputes may 
demand the virtual world owner act. One class action lawsuit against 
Linden Lab was based on its alleged failure to act to protect user property 
(p.193). Users may instead sue each other, but virtual world owners may be 
dragged into these disputes as well (p.141). From the standpoint of virtual 
world owners, creative freedom for users combined with user ownership 
can “attract lawsuits from all directions” (p.193).  
 
Virtual world owners—the “online overlords” (p.195)—recognize all of 
these problems and are likely to protect themselves with contract terms 
sometimes perceived (rightly or wrongly) as one-sided (pp.93-96). As a 
contributing cause of one-sided terms, Lastowka points to the problems of 
consumers not being able to freely negotiate terms with virtual world 
owners and often not reading the terms (p.91). While these are conventional 
concerns, I doubt the potential problem here has much to do with contracts 
of adhesion.12 For most people, even most contracts professors, not needing 
to negotiate or even read most contracts is surely a blessing, not a curse. 
There may still be virtual world terms that the law should not enforce, and 
interesting questions will no doubt arise about whether one-sided terms in 
these contracts rise to the level of unconscionability, but like the questions 
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mentioned earlier, I see these issues as more likely representing the nuances 
of contract law rather than truly new law.      
 
Lastowka’s most aggressive suggestion for dealing with at least some of the 
legal problems of virtual worlds is to create “democratic and participatory 
structures,” ones that would empower players by allowing them to more 
directly participate in the governance of virtual worlds. He doesn’t detail 
how these should be created or argue for particular participatory structures, 
but he does briefly describe one experiment in virtual government in the 
relatively small virtual world of LambdaMOO (pp.40-41, 79-84). He 
describes the experiment, while it lasted, as “complicated, theatrical, 
contentious, and time-consuming” (p.82). Weighing against this innovation 
in other virtual worlds would be the desires of the players themselves. I 
assume Lastowka is correct when he predicts most players would not be 
interested in virtual legislatures or similar features in their virtual worlds 
(pp.89, 195).  
 
With easy entry and exit into virtual worlds and extensive competition 
among them, I worry much less than Lastowka about the “anarchic online 
frontier,” and I also doubt the future of virtual law becoming the distinctive 
field Lastowka envisions. I readily agree, however, that the legal questions 
raised by virtual worlds are interesting, substantive, and worthy of scholarly 
attention, and Lastowka’s book provides an excellent introduction to them. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Given the nature of the book, it is perhaps a justified quibble to note that 
Lastowka incorrectly refers to Ralph Baer as the inventor of Pong and the 
inventor of the patent covering table tennis, a patent that figured 
prominently in the legal history of the video game industry (p.37). Baer is 
certainly relevant to the general discussion as he is credited with the pioneer 
patent in the video game industry. See Magnavox Co. v. Chicago Dynamic 
Indus., Nos. 74-1030 and 74-2510, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17996, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1997) (“[Baer’s] ’480 patent, I think, is the pioneer patent 
in this art[.]”). He is also relevant to the more specific history of Pong, but 
Baer credits William Rusch with the idea for the table tennis video game. 
See Ralph H. Baer, VIDEOGAMES: IN THE BEGINNING 45-47 (2005); 
Deposition of Ralph H. Baer, Midway Mfg. Co. v. Magnavox Co., No. 74-
1657, at 11:28 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1976) (“Q. Do you credit Mr. Rusch with 
having conceived the ping pong type game where one image appears to 
bounce off another? A. To the best of my recollection, that’s how it was.”). 
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Rusch is also the inventor listed on the relevant patent.  See U.S. Patent No. 
RE28,507 (“Television Gaming Apparatus”). As Baer notes in his own 
history of video games, it was Rusch’s patent that was the critical one for 
determining infringement during the many years of litigation. Baer, supra 
note 1, at 126. See also Magnavox Co. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 80-4124, 1982 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13773, at *96 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1982) (finding 
infringement of the ’507 patent); Magnavox Co. v. Chicago Dynamic 
Indus., Nos. 74-1030 and 74-2510, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17996, at *16-17 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1997) (same).  
 
2 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 245-46 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) (suggesting that the game play mechanics for the movement of video 
game playing pieces are subject to copyright protection); Midway Mfg. Co. 
v. Artic Int’l, 704 F.2d 1009, 1013-1014 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that an 
unlicensed device that speeds up the rate of play of a video game violated 
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner to produce derivative works). 
 
3 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, 2 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 7:26 (2d ed. 2010); Restatement (3d) of Unfair Competition, § 
47 cmts. b and c. 
 
4 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. 
Legal. F. 207, 207 (1996). See also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the 
Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1999) (“I 
agree that our aim should be courses that ‘illuminate the entire law[.]’”). 
 
5 Bernard Suits, THE GRASSHOPPER: GAMES, LIFE AND UTOPIA 48-
49 (Broadview 2005). Lastowka cites page 34 for this quotation. 
 
6 Id. at 39 (emphasis added). 
 
7 See Georgia High School Assoc. v. Waddell, 285 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Ga. 1981). 
 
8 Id. 
 
9 See, e.g., Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325, 337-38 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[A] participant has a 16.7% chance of being killed or seriously injured 
and an 83.3% chance of not being killed or seriously injured in a game of 
Russian Roulette each time he puts the gun to his temple and pulls the 
trigger. The act is so dangerous and so lacking in social utility, however, 
The IP Law Book Review 67
                                                                        
  
                                                                                                                                                      
that it demonstrates extreme indifference to human life and serves to 
distinguish murder from manslaughter.”). 
 
10 The policy states, “[A]nything considered a valid play style in Ultima 
Online is not considered harassment. In other words, player killing and 
thievery, including res-killing, is not considered harassment. By valid, we 
mean that there are game mechanics created around these play styles in 
Felucca, such as stat loss, the thieving skill, bounty systems, murder counts, 
the existence of guards, etc. Ultima Online is a role-playing game that 
encourages various play styles, and players should seek ways of protecting 
themselves against these play styles through game mechanics rather than 
calling on customer support staff for help in these cases.” Ultima Online 
Harassment Policy, available at http://support.uo.com/harass.html 
(emphasis in original). 
 
11 See, e.g., Grove v. Charbonneau Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 240 N.W.2d 853, 
856 (N.D. 1976) (“The offer made by Charbonneau Buick stated that a 1974 
Pontiac Catalina would be awarded to the ‘first entry who shoots a hole-in-
one on Hole No. 8.’”). 
 
12 See generally Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 Mich. L. 
Rev. 933 (2006). 
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THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW 
FOR THE UNITED STATES, by Roberta Rosenthal Kwall.  Stanford 
University Press, 2010, 247 pp. Cloth $22.45. 
 
Reviewed by Shubha Ghosh, University of Wisconsin Law School. 
ghosh7@wisc.edu. 
 
Professor Roberta Kwall’s book brings together a wealth of academic 
literature and case law analysis to make the argument for a more fully 
developed and rounded moral rights regime in the United States.  For those 
readers unfamiliar with the debate within copyright law, a moral rights 
regime is a system of legal rights and duties that protects the rights of an 
author of a work from the distortion, misattribution, or unauthorized or 
unfavorable publication of the work.  Continental Europe originated such a 
system in the Nineteenth Century.  The theoretical underpinnings are in the 
work of Immanuel Kant on the relationship between the private and public 
spheres and the need for protecting the dignity interests of individuals who 
publicize their private thoughts.  Moral rights developed on the European 
continent through the efforts of Victor Hugo as a means to protect the 
interests of authors against publishers.  A moral rights regime recognizes an 
inalienable right in the dignity of authors against publishers who would treat 
authorial works as mere commodities to be altered, distributed, and 
commercialized as the market demanded.   
 
Professor Kwall offers an original argument in support of legal reform in 
the United States that would recognize the moral rights of authors.  Her 
argument begins with a recognition of the creative urge in individual 
authors (pp.11-12).  This creative urge, grounded in spirituality, imbues 
works of authorship with a meaning and message (pp.20-21).  Professor 
Kwall argues that a moral rights regime is needed to protect this meaning 
and message from misattribution and from adaptations and uses that 
compromise the integrity of the work (pp.21-22).  With this aim in mind, 
Professor Kwall explores how moral rights are consistent with the public 
domain (pp.66-67), with separating the rights of employer and employees in 
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copyrighted works (pp 100-101), with protecting the artistic persona more 
effectively than traditional right of publicity doctrines (pp.129-131), and 
with recognizing international human rights treaties (pp.143-44).  She 
concludes with a reform proposal for recognizing a right of attribution and a 
limited right of integrity in the Copyright Act (pp.148-150). 
 
As Professor Kwall reminds us, United States Copyright law has long 
eschewed such subtleties and treated copyrighted work as an ordinary 
commodity subject to utilitarian-based legal regulation (pp.42-43).  This 
arrangement suited the United States fine until the country had to recognize 
some form of moral rights in order, in the late 1980’s, to be able to sign 
onto the Berne Convention, a multilateral treaty governing global 
copyrights.  Professor Kwall’s case for moral rights, needless to say, is not 
based on such expediency.  Her goal is to develop a rich theoretical 
justification for a moral rights regime and a legislative proposal for 
implementing moral rights within existing copyright law.  Her broader goal 
is to break free of the utilitarian constraints on United States copyright law 
in order to recognize greater legal protections for creators and the creative 
persona (which may or may not be distinct depending on how one reads the 
argument).  The book is provocative and a seminal academic work on the 
topic of moral rights.  But for those mindful of intellectual property policy, I 
would be very cautious in moving its ideas out of the academic realm and 
into that of concrete policy, for reasons I develop below. 
 
At a very basic level, Professor Kwall is making the case for non-economic 
rights in copyright law.  She begins the book with a discussion of how U.S. 
copyright law does not protect authorial integrity or attribution.  For 
example, if I publish a work but put the name of the wrong author on the 
work, I have not violated copyright law.  Similarly, if I destroy the work or 
physically mutilate the work, I also have not violated copyright.  In some 
circumstances, the author can obtain a remedy for the economic harm 
created by these acts through tort remedies, such as defamation or 
conversion.  But federal copyright law offers no or limited redress.  What is 
troubling for Professor Kwall is copyright law’s silence as to the 
noneconomic harm created in these two examples, specifically the harms to 
the authorial personality and the creative vision imbued by the author.  The 
work is an extension of the author, and the distortion and destruction of the 
work inure to the author. A system of economic rights misses this point 
entirely. 
 
What is original about Professor Kwall’s argument is her grounding of these 
non-economic interests in a more sophisticated understanding of the 
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motivations of individual creators. Utilitarian foundations for copyright, 
Professor Kwall implies, are based on material gain as the sole, or primary, 
motivation for creation.  Psychology and religion prove otherwise.  It would 
not be a distortion of Professor Kwall’s argument to say that she sees the 
roots of creativity as spiritual, whether understood in emotional or 
theological terms.  This argument is developed in the second chapter of her 
book and is the basis for the rest of her argument, which consists of 
identifying how U.S. copyright law is out of step with the legal regimes of 
other countries.  I would argue that her case for understanding the 
motivations for creativity is the keystone for her book.  Starting from that 
premise, I will make it the primary focus of the rest of this review.  Does 
Professor Kwall have it right about what motivates creativity and, if so, do 
her critique and policy recommendations follow? 
 
Professor Kwall isolates two distinct types of motivation for creativity, non-
economic and spiritual.  Although they can be confused, they are different.  
Non-economic motivation is based on something other than the calculation 
of the return or reward of creating a new work.  An artist may create 
spontaneously or on a whim.  The work may be a labor of love, resulting 
from much sacrifice and both emotional and physical pain.  Nonetheless, 
the creator continues to produce the work purely for the sake of creating.   
Spiritual motivation may also involve such sacrifice and may, from a cost-
benefit perspective, not be worth it.  But a creator driven by spritual 
motivation gains something: a spiritual reward, the ecstasy of spiritual 
release, the satisfaction of serving one’s muse.  One can go so far as to say 
that spiritual motivation may include the love of lucre, the reward that 
comes from material success is a sign of divine election.  Adam Smith’s 
infrequent use of the term “invisible hand” in The Wealth of Nations was 
meant ironically, a jab at those who viewed wealth as the result of invisible 
forces as opposed to the hard work and energies of the mercantile class and 
workers.  A case could be made that the wealth of nations derives from non-
economic motivation, individuals acting in their narrow interest to work and 
provide labor independent of any direct reward from that labor. 
 
Motivations for any act are complex.  Do we write law review articles for 
monetary reward?  Spiritual ones?  Purely personal ones?  I imagine all of 
these motives are true.  An acquaintance who is an English professor asked 
why I cared so deeply about a specific author and his novels.  From his 
perspective, a new novel from the particular author meant more things to 
write articles about and the greater prospect for a raise.  The time I spend 
reading, thinking, and writing on the same novel goes seemingly 
unrewarded.  Is this an investment in some yet-to-be seen reward, a frolic, a 
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source of spiritual satisfaction? Depending on how one looks at my acts, 
and when, my motivation can be construed to be any one of these.  Because 
of the inherent ambiguity of motivations, they generally do not serve as a 
compelling linchpin for policy and legal doctrine.  They may be a factor to 
consider in some cases, for example in discerning mens rea.  But too much 
should not be made of them. 
 
Yet motivations are critical to Professor Kwall’s argument, and they are 
critical in any incentive-based justification for intellectual property rights.  I 
am not a big fan of incentive-based theories, largely for the same reasons 
that I am skeptical about the concept of motivation.  Nonetheless, I may be 
in a minority on this point, and the dominant rhetoric to justify intellectual 
property rights is some variation of an incentive-based theory.  The problem 
is that even within incentive-based theories, Professor Kwall’s proposal for 
a moral rights regime in the United States seems flawed for several reasons.   
 
First, if one accepts the proposition that motivations are mixed, it is not 
clear why protection for economic motivations would not be adequate for 
protecting non-economic and spiritual ones.  Other areas of law also cover 
multiple types of injuries without providing redress for all harms.  Contract 
breach can result in emotional injury for which contract law offers little 
remedy.  Tort law distinguishes between recoveries for physical injuries, 
emotional injuries, and economic injuries and carefully circumscribes what 
can be recovered for the latter two categories and has limits on the first one 
as well.  These choices may reflect ideology or conceptual biases towards 
quantification.  But more assuredly, they reflect practical choices about 
what the legal system is capable of doing.  Professor Kwall is less 
convincing about why a focus solely on economic motivations in 
intellectual property is inadequate for what the legal system can deliver.  
 
Second, even if Professor Kwall responds to the last objection on 
deontological grounds, that we need to protect noneconomic motivations 
because it is the right thing to do, she would still need to distinguish 
between noneconomic and spiritual motivations.  If creators would produce 
even without the economic reward of copyright, what then should be the 
basis for remedy?  It does not necessarily follow that a creator with such 
noneconomic motivation would care about correct attribution or integrity 
either.  My guess is that much of the content on YouTube is spontaneous 
creation, people who happen to have a recording device at the right time and 
in the right place.  Much is also staged creation by people who act on a 
whim with what seemed at the time to be a funny idea.  Would 
misattribution or distortion of the sort Professor Kwall espouses be of 
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concern to such creators?  I am skeptical.  I am confident, however, if such 
spontaneous or whimsical creation became iconic or economically valuable 
(think, for example, of the Zapruder film of President Kennedy’s 
assassination), the creators would pursue those interests zealously.  What is 
labeled noneconomic motivation masks this implicit lottery. 
 
However, Professor Kwall’s case becomes stronger for creators who are 
driven by spiritual motivations.  For such creators, the injury that occurs 
from a misattribution or a distortion cannot be readily quantified or even 
translated into the calculus of legal claims protecting against defamation or 
conversion.  On this point, Professor Kwall stands on stronger grounds.  
Skeptics may harp on the abstruseness and lack of clarity in protecting 
“spiritual interests.”  But let me be the first to defend Professor Kwall’s 
identification of spiritual motivations.  The defense has little to do with 
one’s theological beliefs.  Rather, I am willing to accept and argue in the 
defense of the existence of psychological factors that are associated with 
creation.  Perhaps they can be reduced to brain chemistry, the equivalent of 
a runner’s high.  Furthermore, these motivations do not fall neatly into 
dichotomies such as religion versus science.  Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species ends with a long paragraph describing the invisible, incremental 
forces that lead to the development of speciation and the spread of life on 
the planet.  To call it spiritual may belie the materialistic theory that he was 
espousing.  But when compared with the literalism, the fixation on the 
Biblical text, that his critics, then and now, essentially extoll, Darwin’s view 
should be understood as spiritual.  Aestheticians, like Edmund Burke, 
would call the feeling sublime.  It is perhaps the feeling some of you may 
have had upon first seeing a natural wonder—Mt. Shasta, the Himalayas, 
the Grand Canyon—a feeling that is stirred and amazingly inspired by a 
hunk of rocks.  Professor Kwall is correct in identifying this emotion, and I 
have no doubt that it plays an important role in creation, both artistic and 
scientific. 
 
The problem is identifying precisely the implications the existence of 
spiritual motivations has for law.  John Muir, Rachel Carson, Ansel Adams 
individually and collectively identified the sublime in the natural world.  
Such feelings stirred the environmental movement which in turn helped to 
shape environmental law.  But it would be a leap to say that environmental 
law somehow protects these spiritual feelings, even if they were an 
inspiration for the law.  The problem of contingent valuation illustrates the 
problem of how to incorporate these values into a measure of recoverable 
damages.  Once again practicality limits how much the sublime can shape 
the law.   
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It is true that within a purely incentive theory of intellectual property, 
spiritual motivations do not necessarily lead to the protections for 
attribution and integrity that Professor Kwall is advocating.  The problem, 
however, is that her recognition of spiritual motivations is too 
underinclusive.  Much labor arguably involves spiritual motivation.  The 
notion of craft, for example, is in part a spiritual one.  But copyright law, 
like all intellectual property law, makes distinctions among different types 
of work, in part for practical reasons, in part because the incentive theory 
cannot fully explain the structure of intellectual property law.  Why is the 
integrity of the creator more needing of protection than other providers of 
labor and service in society?  Dignity should have more of a role in the 
structure of the legal system than it does, but I feel hard pressed to conclude 
that it should take the form that Professor Kwall prescribes.   
 
Admittedly, Professor Kwall’s case is limited to recognizing dignity-based 
claims in copyright law and so the previous critique may be deemed as 
misguided.  But even within the parameters of copyright law, Professor 
Kwall’s appeal to spiritual motivations is underinclusive.  If the laying of 
paint on canvas, the putting of words on paper, the snap of a photograph, 
each has a spiritual component, then so do the viewing and reading of 
objects.  The notion of the sublime applies equally, and perhaps more 
forcefully, to the audience for a work.  Music has charms to sooth the 
savage breast, and that spiritual soothing, within the terms of Professor 
Kwall’s argument, deserves recognition within intellectual property law.   
Once one also recognizes that spirituality is as much a collective 
experience, as an individual one, Professor Kwall’s claims return us to the 
central questions that inform intellectual property policy.  Is IP law about 
individual reward or access?  Are the terms of IP individual or collective?  
Is IP policy about individual ownership or commons management?  
Professor Kwall’s identification of spiritual motives in creation does not 
clarify these questions and merely adds to the ongoing debate over the 
structure and purpose of intellectual property. 
 
Underlying Professor Kwall’s arguments is an appeal to stewardship in 
intellectual property (pp.18-19).  Unfortunately, this concept is not well 
developed in the book, except for a brief discussion in the context of 
copyright duration (p.58).  The concept of stewardship certainly is 
connected to notions of spirituality and the sublime in intellectual property 
as it is in environmental law.  To view intellectual property in terms of 
stewardship is to recognize that creativity is beyond the scope of finitely 
lived individual authors and the needs of the current generation.  The 
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problem is how to channel the notion of stewardship into concrete legal 
reform.  In Professor Kwall’s book, the concept of stewardship is raised and 
then dropped as the author takes the concept of spirituality to support the 
rights of attribution and integrity.  But in taking such a narrow focus, the 
author ignores how the concept of stewardship would apply to all users and 
creators within the intellectual property system.  The reform proposals 
assume intellectual property rights are individual and not within a broader 
communal system.  As a result, the argument replicates some of the 
criticisms of intellectual property and belies the appeal to stewardship that 
was an enticing start to the book. 
 
The individualistic focus of Professor Kwall’s argument is ironic in light of 
the origins of the moral rights tradition in copyright.  Immanuel Kant’s 
conception of the moral rights system recognized an intimate connection 
between the public and private realms.  Creators would retreat to private 
domains to develop their ideas and their work which in turn would be 
disseminated in the public realm.  Distortions of the work in the public 
realm would affect what creators did in the private realm by either 
influencing creators to retreat permanently from the public or to refrain 
from creating altogether.  This vision of private and public realms in tandem 
informs much of contemporary intellectual property law, as can be seen in 
discussions of secrecy, branding, and privacy in the fair use context.   
Needless to say and perhaps not surprising, Kant had a very monastic view 
of creation.  In the modern world, the public and private are not distinct 
realms and overlap in the creation and dissemination of creative works.  
Professor Kwall’s defense of moral rights strikes me as a retreat from the 
public-private remix we inhabit today to an individualistic notion of 
creativity.  This point may be most apparent in her discussion of joint 
authorship and the claim that one co-author may have a claim against 
distortions of the work by other co-authors (pp.100-101).  I was left 
wondering why this veto power is justified and what about the role of user 
generated creation and remix more broadly.  Arguably, it takes a village to 
make a work or to shape an individual soul, even one driven to create. 
 
Grounding moral rights law in spiritual foundations ignores the practical 
politics that drove the development of what we call the moral rights 
tradition.  As a protection for the dignity of authors and artists, moral rights 
was a means of protection against publishers, whose focus was solely on the 
commercial potential for a work, ignoring the vision of the creator.  The 
famous case of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.1 is an 
example of this tension.  The broadcast company, as publisher, distorted the 
work of the Monty Python troupe as it was first being introduced to the U.S. 
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audience.  The court fashioned a remedy based on contract law and 
trademark law, that was, as Professor Kwall points out, unsatisfactory as a 
policy matter (pp.32-33).  But the court’s solution illustrated the height of 
pragmatism in protecting the interests of the authors against the acts of the 
publishers.  The U.S. statutory attempt at moral rights through the Visual 
Artists Rights Act (VARA) completely ignores the roots of moral rights in 
limiting the rights of publishers.  The published cases interpreting VARA 
illustrate a tension the Act creates between artists and users, specifically 
municipalities or museums as surrogates for users.   
 
Although I find much of value in her book, I am concerned that Professor 
Kwall’s reform proposal might also create further tension between artists 
and users, ignoring the purpose of moral rights law as protection against 
publishers.  The source of this tension is in identifying creativity as a 
personal, spiritual experience which ignores the social context of both 
creativity and spirituality.  It is too limiting to view religion as purely a 
personal matter.  Religion and spirituality are not only about personal 
salvation or personal expression.  Instead, religion and spirituality see 
personal salvation as part of building community norms and values, which 
would include in the copyright context values of access.  Perhaps Professor 
Kwall does not pay enough attention to these communitarian values.  But 
her book may pave the path for a broader, more inclusive notion of 
intellectual property. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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INHERENT VICE:  BOOTLEG HISTORIES OF VIDEOTAPE AND 
COPYRIGHT by Lucas Hilderbrand. Duke University Press, 2009, 
320 pp. Paper $24.95.   
 
Reviewed by Marc H. Greenberg, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
mgreenberg@ggu.edu. 
 
Over the past few decades, legal scholars have recognized the merit of 
focusing scholarly efforts on the role law plays in its interaction with other 
areas of academic and practical disciplines.  Cross-disciplinary efforts that 
focus on law and society, law and economics, law and science and related 
areas have become the norm.  Lucas Hilderbrand’s 2009 book, INHERENT 
VICE:  BOOTLEG HISTORIES OF VIDEOTAPE AND COPYRIGHT is a 
fascinating contribution to this cross- disciplinary oeuvre.  Hilderbrand is an 
Assistant Professor of Film and Media Studies at the University of 
California, Irvine. Although not a lawyer or legal academic, he has 
consulted with attorneys and law professors in his endeavor to understand 
and offer commentary on the role copyright law played in the relatively 
short-lived history of videotape and videotape recorders. 
 
The book is presented in two parts. The first part begins with a thirty-page 
introduction entitled The Aesthetics of Access, in which Hilderbrand 
introduces the array of agendas which inform the book, ranging from 
offering a validation of video via an aesthetic reading of its history and 
impact, to the presentation of an argument that copyright law includes 
users’ rights of access in addition to creators’ rights. 
 
In his Introduction, Hilderbrand explains that the title, INHERENT VICE is 
derived from a phrase librarians use to describe the effect the acidity of 
chemically processed wood-pulp paper has on book pages—this is what 
turns the pages brown and brittle with age. Turning to video, he asserts that 
it has two inherent vices: its degenerative properties (known to anyone who 
now tries to play back videos recorded more than ten years ago—sound 
quality and picture deteriorate pretty quickly), and its role as a “bootleg 
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technology” created “for the purpose of recording television without 
permission” (p.6). 
 
This characterization of video recorders as outlaw tech seems a bit of a 
romanticized stretch.  Home audio taping was already the norm by the time 
video recorders were introduced to consumers, and no television networks 
brought suit against video recorder companies for unauthorized taping of 
shows.  It was only motion picture companies, worried that home taping of 
uninterrupted cable broadcasts of their feature films would cut into the pre-
recorded tape market, which led to Universal filing its action against Sony’s 
Betamax recorder. 
 
Hilderbrand continues this discussion with two assertions that are at the 
core of INHERENT VICE.  I found both of these assertions troubling and 
largely unsupported.  First, he asserts that “[i]t was imagined that video 
could become a medium for the people and a viable alternative to broadcast 
networks programming”, and that “[A]udience access suggests a partial 
reorientation of power” (p.8). Hilderbrand doesn’t explain who, if not the 
audience, does hold the power in this context.  The issue is by no means a 
simple one. The television industry, particularly today, isn’t dominated by a 
single source or group—artists, distribution companies, networks, cable 
distribution companies, and others share power in an uneasy union. To the 
extent Hilderbrand is arguing that the creation and presentation of art by 
artists places them in a power relationship with their audience, I am a bit 
dubious of this claim—the struggle most artists encounter in finding ways 
to get their work noticed, distributed and to make a living from their art 
suggests very little power resides in their hands. 
 
The second assertion is that bootlegging, a concept generally defined as the 
unauthorized recording and distribution of audio tapes and performances, 
should be re-defined as a “[f]air use of video technologies”;  a use 
Hilderbrand praises, saying: “Fair use bootlegging can be a beautiful thing” 
(p.23).  He goes on to distinguish his conception of bootlegging from 
piracy, thusly: “Pirates steal for profit, not for the egalitarian or productive 
redistribution of culture and information”. Id.  He justifies the theft involved 
in this “redistribution” by noting that despite “[w]hining about piracy, the 
technology manufacturers and studios still reap enormous revenues and will 
surely find new business models to continue doing so.” Id. 
 
The distinction Hilderbrand offers between bootlegging and piracy, that the 
former is done with good intentions and for the benefit of the community, 
whereas the latter remains theft that should be punishable by law seems to 
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suggest that civil remedies for infringement should be eliminated or at least 
greatly narrowed.  In  essence he seems to be championing a sort of Robin 
Hood approach to copyright—that it is indeed acceptable to rob the rich for 
the benefit of the poor—a particularly difficult policy to apply in reality, 
given the difficulty of defining who fits in each category—human endeavor 
is a bit too fluid to pin down so easily. 
 
The Introduction is followed in the first part by a detailed analysis of the 
history of video, entitled Be Kind, Rewind:  The Histories and Erotics of 
Home Video (pp.33-72).  In this chapter, Hilderbrand takes the reader back 
to the rise of video in the 1970’s, chronicling the rapid spread of this 
groundbreaking technology throughout the world, and its unique qualities as 
a means of not only playing back pre-recorded videos (which actually came 
later in the history), but also as a way for people to record and distribute 
their own videos, and amateur versions, both copies and derivative works, 
of pre-existing copyright protected audiovisual works. In support of his 
bootlegging thesis from the Introduction, he notes that adult film 
entrepreneur David Friedman asserted that “the home video market was 
‘founded by pirates and pornographers’” 1 (p.34). 
 
In the second chapter of part one of INHERENT VICE, Hilderbrand offers 
his analysis of how the law, and in particular copyright law, responded to 
video recorders and videocassette uses. This chapter, entitled The Fairest of 
Them All? Home Video, Copyright, and Fair Use, starts with a description 
of copyright law and fair use, followed by an analysis of Sony v. Universal2, 
the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision applying fair use doctrine to 
videotape technology, a case which has become known by the name of the 
first video recorder, the Sony Betamax, ie:  the “Betamax Case” (pp.77-
114).   
 
In this section of the book Hilderbrand aligns himself with the views of 
Prof. Lawrence Lessig and the “copyleft” movement.  Hilderbrand presents 
the argument that contemporary copyright has become a tool of corporate 
interests to suppress free expression, noting: 
 
The considerable liberty for users in the early, anonymous, and 
unregulated days of home video, the Internet, and even YouTube 
has repeatedly given way to more constrained, corporatized, and 
consumptive uses. 
    … 
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As Lessig argues, in the digital media age, the content, the 
distribution, and the hardware are typically all owned or controlled 
by corporations with vested interests in regulating them. 
    … 
But copyright law, in particular, has increasingly served the interests 
of big  media at the expense of audiences and, to a certain extent, 
creators3 (pp.78-79). 
 
Hilderbrand supports the argument that this “corporatizing” of copyright is 
a movement away from copyright’s fundamental grant, which he asserts 
was targeted not only to protect creators, but also those who view and 
engage with their works:  
 
Copyright works through a bargain:  artists and publishers are 
granted protection to commercially exploit their works in exchange 
for making them publicly accessible. This means that copyright is 
intended to serve the  interests of the audience as much as it rewards 
publishers, distributors, writers, filmmakers, musicians and 
artists….L. Roy Patterson and Stanley W. Lindberg argue that users’ 
interests in copyright law are as important as those of authors and 
entrepreneurs, yet because users’ rights of access are implicit, they 
are often forgotten4 (p.80). 
 
The argument that copyright law confers rights on users as well as creators 
is subject to criticism on several fronts:  first, if this right exists, it must be 
implied from conduct, since nothing in Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Constitution expressly provides for it; second, since copyright rights exist 
and, under the 1976 Act, are vested, once a work is placed in a tangible 
form, publication is no longer required before rights exist—so artists are 
granted protection even if they never publish their works; and lastly, the 
argument that users have equal rights under copyright law has only come to 
the forefront of the debate as a result of the ease of copying and distribution 
the digital age affords users—no one claimed to have an inherent right to 
make copies of published books and distribute them without penalty until it 
became easily possible to do so online. 
 
The position that copyright has, particularly through the terms of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and the “opt-out” nature of the 1976 Act, aided 
in the “corporatizing” of creative works, has been cogently presented by 
Professors Lessig, Neil Netanel, Edwin Baker, Yochai Benkler, Jed 
Rubenfield5, and many others.  Yet these arguments are not unanimously 
accepted among copyright scholars. In my article, Reason or Madness: A 
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Defense of Copyright’s Growing Pains6, I note that articles by Professors 
Paul Schwartz & William Treanor, Kevin Galbraith and Julia Mahoney7, as 
well as my work, offer a very different view.  The explosive growth of 
creative, expressive works from millions of voices given new-found access 
in the digital age, offers a contrary view to the concern that expression is 
being suppressed by corporate giants.  The global nature of this expressive 
explosion is also often overlooked by copyright’s critics, whose focus often 
overlooks creative works in Asia, Africa, South America and the rest of the 
world. 
 
Unfortunately, Mr. Hilderbrand does not devote, to any significant degree, 
any part of his critique of copyright to explore the other side, the pro-
creators side, of this debate.  Had he done so, the contribution INHERENT 
VICE offers in this debate might have been more balanced, and might have 
offered recognition of the nuanced nature of this issue. 
 
A final note on this chapter dealing with law and video: Hilderbrand is 
critical of the DMCA, arguing that in its desire to protect the nascent 
Internet market, it went overboard in its pro-business orientation. He 
concludes as follows: 
 
Policies with a goal of starting up the Internet should have taken the 
form of short-term funding initiatives or regulatory guidelines rather 
than a permanent addition to copyright law; with the goal of 
establishing Internet commerce by and large achieved, the law is 
overdue for reevaluation—a reconsideration that the Supreme Court 
has yet to undertake (p.103). 
 
This struck me as an odd proposal. It is not the Supreme Court’s role to 
undertake a reevaluation of law—that is the province of Congress.  
Reevaluation of the DMCA has been on ongoing project of a number of 
congressional committees, a process complicated by the need to try to find 
new approaches that reasonably accommodate the often conflicting needs of 
a wide array of stakeholders. 
 
The second part of INHERENT VICE offers readers three case studies:  the 
conflict between the Vanderbilt Television News Archive and CBS over 
whether copyright protected television news broadcasts; the fascinating 
history of filmmaker Todd Haynes’ 1987 satire of the sad story of pop 
singer Karen Carpenter, entitled Superstar: The Karen Carpenter Story, told 
using Barbie-style dolls, and chronicling the rise of the Carpenters as a pop 
group, and the decline and ultimate death of Karen Carpenter due to 
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complications stemming from her anorexia;  and the use of video chain 
letters as a network in the riot grrrl feminist community (pp.117-224). 
 
These case studies are offered to show the benefits bootlegging activity 
offers to these different communities, despite their being infringing copies 
and/or derivative works.  The author views this activity as the kind of 
benign infringement the law should be able to discern and allow. 
 
Scattered throughout the book are what the author calls Video Clips; these 
are short (4-6 pages) profiles depicting ways in which video had, and 
continues to have, cultural impact. One Clip focuses on video retailing, and 
how unauthorized duplication tapes, or “dubs” proliferate in the retail 
context, another features videos sold at genre expos, yet another explains 
the work of the Frameworks listserv, an e-mail discussion group about 
underground film, and the last clip offers a discussion about artists who use 
the deterioration of video over time to create artwork based on the distortion 
and deterioration of the media. 
 
While I found the case studies and video clips to be interesting reading, 
particularly the discussion of the Superstar video, my sense is that if, after 
reading part one of the book, you have accepted the author’s view of the 
importance and value to the “commons” of what he defines as bootlegging, 
then you will see the case studies and video clips as valuable anecdotal 
support of that thesis.  Viewed independently, however, they don’t offer 
sufficient support of his viewpoint given their fairly narrow focus. 
 
Hilderbrand concludes the book with an Epilogue entitled: YouTube: Where 
Cultural Memory and Copyright Converge.  His focus here is on the 
controversial practice of YouTube users uploading unauthorized video 
clips.  He praises the impact this practice has in a variety of contexts.  He 
posits that it is a form of community archive, while acknowledging that the 
lack of organization and completeness of it precludes considering it to be a 
true and formal archive that academics could use. He opines that the 
situation in which the same unauthorized clip is uploaded with added 
content, or in a parody form, results in “[b]lurring  distinctions between 
authorship, ownership and distributing rights”, suggesting that “[t]hese 
postings reflect the ethics of the cultural (and creative) commons” (p.240). 
This view is a restatement of his view about video—unauthorized non-
profit use of others’ content is a “productive redistribution” which should 
not be penalized. Current case law is split on this issue—a series of cases 
allowing unauthorized copying if the work is “transformative” have recently 
been followed by other cases (the Harry Potter codex case is an example) 
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finding that the changes to a work aren’t transformative enough to escape 
copyright infringement liability.  Historically, these kind of pendulum 
swings ultimately result in compromise approaches that adopt a middle-
ground position – the next few years of case decisions may move us to that 
firmer ground. 
 
One benefit of INHERENT VICE is that it gets you thinking about the uses 
of video in the past, and the extent and manner in which they are replicated 
today.  For example, unlike the video recorders of the past, DVD players 
generally don’t have recording capability, and the market for blank DVDs is 
not based on their use in these players.  Does this mean that consumers no 
longer are interested in creating their own content?  No, what has happened 
instead is that consumers have found a far more robust set of tools for 
creating video content—their computers and even more frequently, video 
cameras embedded in smart phones and related mobile devices. The ability 
to create visual mash-ups and add a sophisticated array of audio and visual 
effects far outstrips the capabilities available to consumers 30 years ago. 
 
In sum, INHERENT VICE, with its blend of history and legal analysis, 
helps place video and videotape recorders in their rightful place in the 
history of copyright in the U.S. and provides food for thought and continued 
debate over the role of copyright in the digital revolution. It is an interesting 
read for scholars of law and culture. 
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BEYOND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MATCHING 
INFORMATION PROTECTION TO INNOVATION, by William 
Kingston.  Edward Elgar, 2010, 256 pp. Hardcover $115.00. 
Reviewed by Kristen Osenga, University of Richmond School of Law. 
kosenga@richmond.edu. 
 
William Kingston frames this book around a clearly stated premise:  the 
focus of information protection regimes has shifted from benefiting the 
public to benefiting private individuals with interests in the game—and this 
shift is not good.  Early on, protection of information was shaped by actors 
with no personal stake but rather a desire to encourage invention and 
innovation for the public good.  These actors were primarily limited by 
constitutional provisions and bureaucratic inefficiencies.  As time went on, 
and as information became a more important commodity, information 
protection schemes were fashioned, or perhaps twisted, by the parties that 
would derive the most benefit.  Stakeholder driven systems are unlikely to 
be able and willing to adapt to changing technology and innovation.  The 
transition from public interests to individual interests, Kingston claims, has 
resulted in a “dysfunctional system” in need of “rescue” (p.125).  Public 
good must be the heart of any reform to information protection, and 
Kingston concludes by offering a set of proposals to that end (pp.136-37). 
The book proceeds in two parts:  First, the book explains the transition of 
information protection regimes from focusing on protecting the public 
interest to benefiting private interests. Second, the book presents a number 
of reforms that would return the balance of information protection to the 
public good (p.vii).  He treats the first goal in roughly the first half of the 
book.  Perhaps because of my familiarity with intellectual property, law, 
and information protection, I found the first half of the book to be less 
relevant.  One intended audience for the book, as stated on its back cover, 
includes “students of IP and innovation [and] patent agents and attorneys.”  
I imagine these groups would react much as I did to the first half of the 
book.  To be fair, throughout this first half, there are a number of interesting 
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historical nuggets buried, even where the topic being described was old hat.  
Another intended audience, “economic policy-makers,” may find the first 
half of the book somewhat more practical, particularly as Kingston weaves 
economic literature and commercial data throughout his discussion of the 
evolution of information protection.  The second half of the book, where 
Kingston sets forth his proposals for improving protection of information, 
will likely be more appealing for all types of readers.  In the context of 
reform proposals, the author shares his wide-ranging knowledge of 
protection regimes in multiple jurisdictions, as well as how protection 
particularly affects different technology areas such as software or genes, to 
provide a solid base on which to understand and evaluate his proposals.  
Although the latter half of the book was much more attention-grabbing from 
my perspective, there are note-worthy portions throughout this book for 
most every reader. 
A quick review of the topics of this book may help elucidate what any 
particular individual reader would find interesting.  Of course, a book 
discussing information rights must necessarily begin by defining what is 
meant by “information” and protection thereof.  In an interesting chapter 
that traverses from Bell’s telephone to Mozart to Murano glass makers in 
Venice, Kingston presents a comprehensive conception of information 
rights by integrating mathematical and biological models of information 
with commons theory and economic thought. 
The next three chapters discuss the historical and current state of 
information rights.  Kingston starts off, not addressing intellectual property 
regimes, but discussing how other means of protecting information may be 
more effective  (p.17).  Again he incorporates historical points of interest, 
using the story of Boulton and Watt’s steam engines to demonstrate how 
information is initially valuable only to those with the capability to make 
use of it, providing a basic advantage to the originator even in the absence 
of protection regimes.  The introduction of corporate structures, such as 
limited liability partnerships and corporations, allowed originators to pair 
with investors to exploit capability (pp.21-25).  After capability, Kingston 
contends that marketing is the second most important means of protection.  
He then covers the basics of trademark law and how it too provides the 
originator of information with market power.  The following chapter on 
patent and copyright protection of information is less intriguing, perhaps 
because it covers well-worn territory or because some of the discussion 
stretches to cover subject matter that is not typically considered 
information, such as pharmaceuticals (p.53), music (p.59), and plants 
(p.64).  Kingston wraps up his discussion of existing regimes with a survey 
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of international protection of information under various intellectual property 
conventions and agreements. 
At this point in the text, Kingston approaches the first of his goals: 
discussing how information rights evolved from a system for public good to 
a system driven by interested parties.  Although information protection 
regimes started with the best intentions, a number of limitations prevented 
these regimes from keeping pace with the evolution of technology.  One 
reason that American law is particularly ill-suited to protect information 
rights is a “particularly strong tether to the past” and a Constitution that 
prohibits forward-looking law (p.85). The Constitution is used to explain 
why the growth of federal trademark law was hampered; why bodies that 
could react quicker to technology change, such as state legislatures, are 
prohibited from doing so; and even why patent office procedures are less 
than effective.  Kingston also considers how bureaucratic influences, such 
as lobbying, led to the shift of information protection for the public good to 
the protection of private interests. 
While the reasoning behind the shift, i.e., that legal development was 
occurring at a much slower pace than technological advancement, seems 
fairly straightforward, the assault by these private interests took place on 
many fronts.  Kingston points to activities at the international, national, and 
industry level, all with the intent of shaping the future of information 
protection for the benefit of the actors involved.  Many of the key 
international intellectual property conventions were negotiated with the best 
interests of the United States and Britain in mind (p.101). At the national 
level, countries often enacted intellectual property laws that were not the 
product of careful legislation to protect the states’ interests, but were based 
on proposals offered either overtly or quietly by interested groups.  
Kingston offers as examples the 1952 United States Patent Act, written by 
patent attorneys but passed by a Congress that did not know what it 
contained or meant (p.102) and the Japanese patent system, which facially 
fulfilled the country’s obligations under international intellectual property 
treaties but worked to the benefit of Japanese conglomerates (pp.106-108).  
Other groups also took advantage of their size and power to focus 
information protection benefits on themselves, including alliances like the 
European Union and industry organizations like the Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe, (UNICE), the tobacco industry, and 
the American music and movie groups, including the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA).   
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Because the existing regimes were not adapted to today’s technology, 
including software, biotechnology, genetic inventions, and business 
methods, the interested parties have forced current systems to accommodate 
these and other advancements as they saw fit.  At the end of the day, we 
have been left with a patent system that is “in crisis,” a copyright system 
that is protecting software in a way that is “bad logic and bad law,” and 
international protection schemes that are simply “imperialistic, outdated, 
and overprotective” (pp.127-28).  Of course, as Kingston acknowledges, 
others have made similar observations and suggested various routes to 
improvement, such as prizes, second-tier patent protection, and 
compensatory liability. 
With this as a background, Kingston sets out a number of proposals to 
improve the protection of information.  He contends that his ideas can be 
put into effect without revamping the system (pp.146-47).  These 
suggestions are as wide ranging as the problems he seeks to repair, such as 
setting out compulsory arbitration, changing the contours of information 
protection, focusing protection on small and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
and considering sui generis protection of information.  Perhaps because of 
this broad scope of proposals he takes on, I feel that some of the proposals 
could use additional consideration and support. 
Kingston begins with those proposals that would require less difficulty in 
implementation.  The easiest to implement, according to the author, would 
be to require arbitration for dispute resolution.  Because this proposal does 
not run afoul of TRIPS so long as an appeal is possible and because only a 
provision of national treatment would be required to make the proposal 
compliant with the Paris Convention, he contends that this solution is well 
within reach.  In fact, Kingston states that there should not be any difficulty 
in introducing compulsory arbitration in the United States, although there 
may be some issues with implementing arbitration in the European Union 
(pp.159-160).  Aside from being easy to implement, Kingston states that 
arbitration is a less expensive option than litigation, which is useful 
particularly for information because of the fuzzy boundaries of these rights.  
Also arbitration is becoming more and more popular in various technical 
industries because of the ability to have an expert arbitrate technical 
disputes.  Kingston points to the interference proceedings in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, as well as the British Patent Office 
opinions procedure, as being potential models when creating the arbitration 
system.  Although I question whether the implementation of such a system 
would be as simple as Kingston contends, I agree that this would certainly 
allow for smaller entities, which may not be able to afford litigation, to be 
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able to participate in shaping information protection, weakening the 
opportunity for large firms to solely control the shape of the laws. 
Kingston next proposes to change the parameters of protection for 
information.  He takes particular issue with the time component of existing 
intellectual property protection—20 years from filing for patent protection, 
50-70 years after the author’s death for copyright protection, and nearly 
indefinite trademark rights.  These time frames simply are not rational 
measures for information.  Kingston instead suggests that money should be 
a better parameter; specifically, protection should last as long as it takes for 
the creator to receive a socially acceptable multiple of the investment he 
made in developing the information.  This multiple should ideally be based 
on the subjectively assessed risk of the endeavor.  The multiple would, of 
course, be difficult to value, but at least a rate that corresponds to the 
amount of investment would lead to more appropriate protection.  The 
multiple would be used as the price to be paid for compulsory licensing of 
the information, and late-comers would be able to use the information by 
sharing in the investment made by the originator.  As further enticement, 
Kingston also proposes that the compulsory licenses be imposed as a one-
time payment, rather than as a royalty.  The originator then has a more 
secure source of recoupment of his risk and the late-comer would have 
greater incentive to make the most use of the licensed information. 
The idea of compulsory licensing based on a multiple is more difficult to 
swallow than the mandatory arbitration proposal.  Kingston acknowledges 
this by providing substantially more support for this suggestion, addressing 
many of the thornier aspects.  Estimating the value of the investment risk, 
and thus the determination of the multiple, is going to be one of the most 
difficult pieces of this proposal.  To this end, Kingston relates how existing 
research programs, such as the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
Programs in the United States, have had some success in developing 
numbers of this type.  There is also discussion on how to establish the 
research and development cost basis on which to apply the multiple.  Next, 
he considers the effects of this proposal on a number of information-heavy 
industries, such as university patents on biotechnology, computer software, 
databases, and pharmaceuticals, concluding in each case that adopting this 
proposal is better than any system currently in place.   
Against the most typical argument, that compulsory licensing decreases 
incentives for firms to engage in research and development, Kingston cites 
to “more than 100 antitrust settlements” that involved compulsory licensing, 
none of which, according to Kingston,  had a significant adverse effect on 
research incentives.  Kingston also argues that some of the most widely 
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licensed patents are also the most profitable, such as the Cohen-Boyer gene-
splicing patent (p.165).  On this point, because it is such a regularly raised 
issue and because, by its very nature, compulsory licensing dilutes the 
incentive of exclusive rights, I would have liked to see a more vigorous 
discussion. 
Even were the compulsory licensing system put in place, Kingston notes 
that it would not have the desired effect for smaller firms.  Additional 
changes to any information protection system would need to be made to 
account for these actors.  While Europe and other areas recognize the 
potential of smaller firms, known as small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), these firms have made the most impact in the United States, both 
in terms of their financial success as well as the number of United States 
Patents received by smaller firms from other countries (p.177). But regular 
information protection regimes are failing these firms.  Either their 
inventions do not reach the level required for protection, because they are 
not novel or obvious in the patent field, or they are sufficiently inventive 
but lack seed capital to go forward.  To address these problems, Kingston 
makes a wide range of suggestions.  For example, inexpensive routes to 
protection would be helpful, such as the concessions made by the British 
Patent Office for individuals and SMEs or petty patents.  He also makes 
suggestions for assisting SMEs to enforce their information protection 
rights, including litigation insurance.  However, as he explains, a feasibility 
study of patent insurance was performed at the behest of the European 
Union and the results were not favorable.  Indeed, the study determined that 
there would need to be compulsory participation for the system not to fail 
(p.186).   
Another proposal that has been better received provides for a period of 
incontestability for SMEs’ intellectual property, not unlike the 
incontestability provision of the United States Orphan Drug Act of 1983.  In 
addition to avoiding the threat of litigation early in the life of the patent, the 
incontestability provision would also make these inventions more attractive 
to investors, thereby negating some of the negative effects of information 
protection that apply particularly to SMEs.  As part of implementing an 
incontestability period, Kingston points to Open Review, a process similar 
to the Peer-to-Patent pilot study occurring in the United States. 
The last proposal that Kingston makes is also the most challenging for 
implementation.  One way to overcome the disadvantages of the existing 
intellectual property regimes as applied to information is to protect 
information directly as information (DPI).  The author was the creator of 
one of two DPI proposals studied by the European Union.1  Kingston’s 
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proposed “Innovation Warrant,”2 the subject of this chapter, is not 
surprisingly the one regime change in the book that is well explained and 
well supported.  It is also the proposal that he indicates is the “best 
candidate” (p.236). 
Kingston lays out the case for and the basics of DPI. The focus is not the 
information itself, but the investment required to make the information into 
something useful.  For example, the question about whether the information 
is sufficiently novel becomes: “Is the subject-matter of the application for 
protection available now in the ordinary course of trade?”  If the answer is 
“no”, what is protected is the investment required to change the answer to 
“yes” (p.210).  In order for the DPI to address some of the problems 
associated with traditional information protection schemes, it is important 
for the protection granted to reflect the risk taken in making the investment.  
The first prong that Kingston poses is that the state should both grant the 
protection and enforce what it grants.  The second prong is how risk should 
be determined.  Kingston illustrates this with a matrix relating type of 
innovation (low, medium, and high) to type of risk (incremental, tech-
transfer, and radical) resulting in some number of years of protection 
(p.215). Although the terms listed in the matrix are generally shorter than 
patent protection, DPI would be preferable because of the period of 
incontestability and because it would be the state’s duty to enforce.  
Kingston discusses in detail the workings of the system, including the 
application and enforcement processes.  Included in these processes are 
elements of opposition proceedings and compulsory licensing, as well as the 
opinion practice used in the British Patent Office.  Some of the other key 
features of the DPI system include protection of expectations, because there 
are categories of risk, calculated in the abstract and not subject to discretion; 
reliance on third-party expertise; and flexibility to adapt to new 
technologies or even to allow for different treatment of particular 
technologies. 
In Kingston’s epilogue, however, he concludes that implementing this 
system in the countries most likely to influence international information 
protection will be quite difficult.  The DPI proposal is unlikely to fall within 
the intellectual property clause of the Constitution and the Department of 
Commerce will not want to set up, under the Commerce clause, a system 
that overlaps so much with the patent system that they already oversee.  
Europe, too, is an unlikely candidate because the European Union has long 
worked on a universal patent for its members and has situated its 
intellectual property matters in Brussels (frustrating the DPI provision of 
enforcement by state).  By considering DPI not as intellectual property, but 
as economic policy, it is possible that European Union members could 
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introduce the system nationally, although single implementations may not 
give as much bang for the buck.  Kingston suggests that Canada or 
Australia may be better suited, but these countries have concerns about 
international intellectual property that would make their adoption of DPI 
improbable. 
As is often the case when trying to convey an extraordinary amount of 
information, not to mention describing and justifying a broad range of 
proposals, it is likely impossible to make all readers happy with what has 
been included and what has not.  There were areas I wish that the author had 
covered more concisely or not at all and areas that I would have liked to 
have seen more analysis and detail.  That being said, this book provides a 
broad, if occasionally superficial, panorama of the current and potential 
future landscape of information protection. 
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Ethics in patent litigation is important to attorneys, not only for moral 
reasons, but also because of the possibility of extreme judicial sanctions. 
Many litigators know of the controversy in the high profile patent 
infringement lawsuit between Broadcom Corporation and Qualcomm Inc., 
which was heard in federal court in the Southern District of California. 
There, during the course of a jury trial, a witness’s testimony revealed that 
relevant documents had not been produced to opposing counsel. Shortly 
thereafter, the magistrate judge referred six Qualcomm attorneys to the 
State Bar of California for disciplinary proceedings for the alleged non-
production of documents. The legal press reported the story and patent 
litigators took note. After further proceedings, the sanctions were eventually 
lifted, but by that time, significant damage had already been inflicted upon 
the attorneys’ reputations and careers. Given that many in the community 
are concerned about this issue, Professor David Hricik’s book on ethics in 
patent litigation is extremely timely. 
 
Professor Hricik is one of the leading scholars on patent ethics. The present 
book is the second of his two volume treatise on ethics. His previous book, 
PATENT ETHICS: PROSECUTION (co-authored with Mercedes Meyer), 
was favorably reviewed by Professor Christopher M. Holman of the 
University of Missouri - Kansas City School of Law.1 In the first book, 
Professor Hricik addressed ethical issues related to practice before the 
United States Patent & Trademark Office. Now, Professor Hricik has turned 
his attention to practice in patent litigation, which mainly occurs in U.S. 
district courts. Both books are geared toward practitioners, not academics, 
which explains the somewhat hefty price of $225 for each book. 
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In the current book, Professor Hricik steers the reader through many aspects 
of patent litigation. The book is well organized and thoughtfully arranged. 
The Table of Contents contains sufficient detail to enable a reader to 
quickly locate relevant sections of the book. There is also a useful and 
detailed Index, as well as a Table of Cases, both of which facilitate use of 
the book. 
 
Additionally, the book is relatively thorough on each topic which it covers. 
For example, Chapter 3 of the book is devoted to conflicts of interest in 
litigation. The book reiterates the basics such as identifying who is the 
client and determining when an attorney-client relationship has been 
formed, and then explains the rules on conflicts of interest relating to former 
clients (pp.15-61) Of particular use, after discussing the “substantial 
relationship” test, the book provides a table with summaries of Federal 
Circuit decisions both finding a substantial relationship and not finding a 
substantial relationship (pp.50-53).  The chapter concludes with an in-depth 
analysis of consents to conflicts, and of other reasons for denial of 
disqualification (pp.62-75). 
 
The book also has a detailed discussion of pre-trial investigations. While 
many attorneys are familiar with the contours of Rule 11 in general, 
Professor Hricik explains the nuances of pre-filing investigations in patent 
litigation in Chapters 5 and 6. He recounts the Federal Circuit case law on 
what constitutes an adequate factual investigation of the accused product 
(pp.94-101). He also sets forth various ethical constraints with which 
attorneys may be less familiar. For example, most lawyers understand that 
they may not directly communicate with a represented party under ABA 
Model Rule 4.2; rather, they must interact with the party’s attorney (pp.107-
109).  But the book expands upon the basic understanding of the rule to 
identify gray areas in the law, such as how long before the filing of a 
lawsuit the rule applies (pp.109-111). Furthermore, common situations 
confronted in patent litigation, such as contacting current employees 
through web sites of the opposing party, are discussed (p.115).  
 
Patent litigators rely heavily on expert witnesses. These witnesses testify 
about a range of issues including infringement, validity and inequitable 
conduct. The book provides straightforward information and advice about 
expert witnesses and reports. It then provides more detailed information 
about conflicts and disqualification of experts in Chapter 8. For instance, 
the book explains that disqualification may be warranted if a first party’s 
expert received confidential information from the opposing party, typically 
when the opposing party was considering engaging the expert (pp.154-165). 
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While most attorneys generally understand how to assist in preparation of 
an expert report, few understand the applicable rules on conflicts dealing 
with experts. Particularly practical, the book sets forth a checklist of best 
practices for dealing with experts (pp.174-77). These include ensuring that 
employee confidentiality agreements are broad, and asking the expert early 
in the engagement about prior work for the opposing party or counsel. 
 
Many of the areas discussed in the book have not been directly addressed by 
Federal Circuit case law. For example, conduct during discovery is rife with 
potential ethical issues. The parties resolve most discovery disputes, often 
after considerable argument and discussion. Sometimes a disagreement 
lingers and is brought to the trial court’s attention. Then, the district court 
judge (or the magistrate judge) must rule on a motion to compel, a motion 
for a protective order, or some other discovery motion. These orders and 
rulings generally are not immediately appealable as they are not final 
orders. Consequently, it is rare for these to ever make their way to the 
Federal Circuit. This explains why there is only a very small body of 
appellate case law relating to discovery in patent cases. Professor Hricik’s 
book had the ability to make a significant dent in this lack of knowledge. 
However, I found his section on discovery slightly unsatisfying; it was less 
than ten pages (pp.182-89).  I fully recognize that it is difficult to discuss 
and analyze the numerous potential discovery issues that can occur in patent 
litigation. However, because ethics play a significant role in discovery, 
more attention is warranted. 
 
In some areas, the law has substantially developed in the brief time period 
(several months) since publication of Professor Hricik’s book. For example, 
district courts have occasionally restricted access to lawyers involved in 
patent prosecution from certain highly confidential documents exchanged in 
patent litigation. These restrictions are located in protective orders and are 
usually called “prosecution bars.” In May 2010, the Federal Circuit decided 
a case of first impression about this very issue, In re Deutsche Bank Trust 
Co. of America.2 The Deutsche Bank case provides the first guidance on 
prosecution bars by the Federal Circuit, and was not yet issued at the time 
of the book’s publication. Professor Hricik rightly notes the issue of 
prosecution bars in protective orders in Chapter 10, but given his study of 
the issue, it is unfortunate we do not have his interpretation of the case or 
his suggestions about how to approach prosecution bars in the future. 
 
Finally, the book should spend more space on the relationship between 
opinion counsel and trial counsel. Opinion and trial counsel both represent 
the same client with similar goals. Because privilege is typically waived for 
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work performed by opinion counsel (and it is rarely, if ever, waived for 
work performed by trial counsel), much thought must be given as to how to 
structure and organize the relationship among the client, opinion counsel 
and trial counsel. Advice from Professor Hricik on this issue would have 
been helpful. While the book explains the Federal Circuit case law on this 
issue including a discussion of In re Seagate and In re Echostar in Chapter 
10, and walks the reader thru the various ethical rules including the 
prohibition in some model ethical rules on lawyers acting as both witnesses 
and advocates, the book does not propose best practices or other guidelines 
for practicing attorneys. 
 
While the book is not perfect, it is an important reference for patent 
litigators. Despite its minor shortcomings, some of which I have noted, the 
book is a significant and useful addition to the scant literature on patent 
litigation ethics. Not only is this book currently the best resource available 
on the topic, its thoroughness will make it essential to litigators for years to 
come. 
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